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Deal or No Deal: Why Courts Should Allow
Defendants to Present Evidence that They Rejected
Favorable Plea Bargains
Colin Miller'
I. INTRODUCTION
Robert Woodsum is charged with two counts of felonious sexual
assault and faces up to fourteen years incarceration if found guilty of
both counts.' Woodsum enters into plea negotiations with the
prosecutor, who offers a deal under which Woodsum would plead guilty
to two misdemeanor charges of simple assault in exchange for the
prosecutor recommending to the judge that Woodsum receive a two year
sentence that would be deferred, contingent on Woodsum's good
behavior and pursuit of counseling.2 Woodsum, however, rejects this
plea bargain, which the State later characterizes as "extraordinarily
beneficial" to Woodsum. When his case proceeds to trial, Woodsum
seeks to admit evidence that he turned down this plea bargain, claiming
that his rejection of such an "extraordinarily beneficial" deal and
willingness to risk fourteen years incarceration is evidence of his
consciousness of innocence.4 The trial court rebuffs his attempt, and
Woodsum is convicted of both counts.
Woodsum's ensuing appeal eventually reaches the Supreme Court of
New Hampshire in State v. Woodsum.6 One of Woodsum's arguments is
that evidence of the prosecutor's offer and his rejection is not precluded
under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 41 0, which, like Federal Rule
Visiting Associate Professor, William and Mary School of Law; Associate Professor, The
John Marshall Law School; Blog Editor, EVIDENCEPROF BLOG, http://lawprofessors.
typepad.comlevidenceprof/. I would like to thank my wife Zoe for her support and assistance in the
writing of this Article.
1. State v. Woodsum, 624 A.2d 1342, 1342-43 (N.H. 1993).
2. Id at 1343.
3. Id at 1342-43.
4. Id. at 1343.
5. Id. at 1342-43.
6. Id. at 1342.
7. Id. at 1343.
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of Evidence 410, merely deems inadmissible statements made during
plea discussions when offered "against the defendant who made the plea
or was a participant in the plea discussions." Woodsum also repeats his
argument that his rejection of the plea deal evinces his innocent state of
mind, and he claims that the State can avoid the admission of such
evidence in the future by having defendants "sign waivers of any right to
introduce rejected, highly beneficial plea offers as evidence." 9 The State
counters that, if the court accepted Woodsum's argument, "competent
prosecutors will simply require such waivers in all cases, thus adding a
new layer of paperwork to the process and undoubtedly expanding
pretrial litigation whenever such a waiver was not obtained."10
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire affirms, finding, inter alia,
that Rule 410 does not provide "express authority for the admission of
the rejection of a plea offer."" Furthermore, the court finds that "[m]any
inferences follow from a defendant's decision to exercise his or her right
to a jury trial, rather than to accept a plea offer," but it only lists two: (1)
The defendant prefers the possibility of acquittal to the certainty of
punishment after a guilty plea, or (2) the defendant truly believes that he
did not commit the crime charged. 12 The court seems to find the first
option more likely, concluding that "[a]n 'extraordinarily beneficial' plea
offer is especially likely to induce a defendant to risk a trial, regardless of
his or her guilt or innocence, for the offer of a beneficial plea may
indicate that there are problems with the State's case." 3
The court does give the second option some credence, noting that
"[i]t is also plausible to infer from the rejection of a beneficial plea
offer.. . that a defendant believes he or she did not commit the crime."' 4
But according to the court, "[t]his belief is .. . only marginally relevant
to the issues in any criminal trial."' Furthermore, "[s]et against the
marginal relevance .. . is the great likelihood that its admission will draw
extraneous, misleading information into a criminal trial .... [And this]
inevitably invites an exploration of such collateral matters as the
8. N.H. R. EVID. 410 (emphasis added); see also FED. R. EVID. 410 (same language).
9. Woodsum, 624 A.2d at 1344.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1343.
12. Id. at 1344.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
408 [Vol. 59
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prosecutor's reasons for making the offer. . . or the defendant's motives
for rejecting it."l 6
Any other court in this country almost certainly would have reached
the same conclusion. In its 1991 opinion in State v. Pearson, the Court
of Appeals of Utah precluded a defendant from presenting evidence that
he rejected a favorable plea bargain, in the process noting that it had
"found no appellate decisions which have reached a contrary result,
given the narrow issue before us." 7  Moreover, no court since 1991
appears to have reached a contrary conclusion.18  Courts thus have
categorically concluded that although Federal Rule of Evidence 410 and
state counterparts merely provide that statements made during plea
discussions are inadmissible "against the defendant," such statements are
also inadmissible "against the prosecution."
In reality, however, a criminal defendant who wants to enter into
plea discussions with the prosecution can rarely prevent the prosecution
from admitting his incriminatory statements made during such
discussions as substantive evidence of his guilt at trial if a plea deal is not
reached. As an example, consider the case of Roger Rebbe. Roger
Rebbe, an accountant, was suspected of preparing false tax returns. 19 He
and his attorney met with government agents, who informed them that
they would not engage in plea discussions unless they both signed a
waiver.20 That waiver provided that if the sides did not reach a plea
agreement, "the government may use . . . statements made by you or
your client at the meeting and all evidence obtained directly or indirectly
from those statements for the purposes of cross-examination should your
client testify, or to rebut any evidence, argument or representations
offered by or on behalf of your client in connection with the trial."21
Rebbe and his attorney signed the waiver, Rebbe made incriminatory
statements-namely, "proffer statements"-during plea discussions, and
22the discussions did not result in a plea agreement. The government
subsequently informed Rebbe of its intent to introduce his incriminatory
statements at trial consistent with the terms of the waiver.23 Rebbe
16. Id.
17. 818 P.2d 581, 583 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
18. See infra notes 99-113 and accompanying text. Most recently, in July 2010, the Sixth
Circuit found no error in the district court's exclusion of such evidence in United States v. Geisen,
612 F.3d 471, 475 (6th Cir. 2010).
19. United States v. Rebbe, 314 F.3d 402, 404 (9th Cir. 2002).
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
2011] 409
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moved to exclude those statements, but the district court denied his
motion, finding that his statements would be "admissible to rebut any
evidence or arguments he made at trial that were inconsistent with his
,,24proffer statements.
After the government rested its case, Rebbe requested an advisory
opinion "as to whether the admissibility of [his] proffer statements had
been triggered." 25 The district court refused to rule on the issue, and
Rebbe decided to hedge his bets by presenting four defense witnesses but
not testifying on his own behalf.26 The gamble, though, did not pay off;
instead, at the close of the defendant's case, the government successfully
moved for the admission of Rebbe's statements as substantive evidence
of Rebbe's guilt.2 7  On Rebbe's ensuing appeal, in United States v.
Rebbe, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Rebbe presented a
defense that was inconsistent with his proffer statements by having his
attorney elicit certain testimony from defense witnesses during direct
examination and prosecution witnesses during cross-examination.28
In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit relied upon the opinion
of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Mezzanatto.29 In
Mezzanatto, the Supreme Court found that a prosecutor can force a
criminal defendant to waive the protections of Federal Rule of Evidence
410 and its counterpart, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (e)(6), by
having him sign a waiver indicating that if a plea deal is not reached and
the defendant testifies at trial, the prosecutor can impeach him with his
contradictory statements made during plea discussions-an impeachment
waiver. 30  To reach this result, the Court rejected the defendant's
argument that Rules 410 and 11 (e)(6) should not be waiveable because it
would discourage defendants from engaging in plea negotiations, finding
that "[a] sounder way to encourage settlement is to permit the interested
parties to enter into knowing and voluntary negotiations without any
arbitrary limits on their bargaining chips."3 1
24. Id. at 404-05.
25. Id. at 405.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 406-09.
29. 513 U.S. 196 (1995).
30. Id. at 205-10; see also United States v. Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285, 291 (5th Cir. 2009)
(noting that "Mezzanatto, for its part, explained that impeachment waivers do not undermine these
efforts. . ." of encouraging candor in plea bargaining).
31. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 208.
410 [Vol. 59
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The Court in Mezzanatto did not answer the question addressed in
Rebbe: Can the prosecution force a criminal defendant to waive the
protections of Rule 410 by having him sign a waiver indicating that if a
plea deal is not reached, the prosecutor can substantively use his
statements made during plea discussions if they contradict any evidence,
arguments or representations offered by or on his behalf?32 That said,
every court addressing a challenge to a waiver like the waiver in
Rebbe-a rebuttal waiver 33-has relied upon the analysis in Mezzanatto
to find the waiver constitutional.34 Moreover, each of the three federal
appellate courts that have addressed the constitutionality of a waiver
allowing the prosecution to use a defendant's statements made during
plea discussions substantively as part of its case-in-chief-a case-in-chief
waiver-has relied upon Mezzanatto to reach the same result. 35
This Article addresses the question of whether courts can
consistently allow prosecutors to present defendants' incriminatory
statements made during plea discussions while precluding those same
defendants from presenting evidence that they rejected favorable plea
bargains. It concludes that courts cannot prevent defendants from
presenting evidence that they rejected favorable plea bargains based
upon Mezzanatto and that none of the arguments against admissibility
hold water.
Part II of this Article details the creation and amendment of Federal
Rule of Evidence 410 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (e)(6).
It pays particular attention to the 1979 amendment to the Rules, which
made clear that defendants are not precluded from introducing into
evidence exculpatory statements made during plea discussions. Part III
focuses upon opinions dealing with evidence of rejected plea bargains
and the various and sundry reasons given by courts for excluding them.
As a counterpoint, it notes that courts consistently have found that
defendants can present evidence that they rejected prosecutorial offers of
immunity but have refused to extend this logic to evidence of rejected
plea bargains. Part IV deals with Mezzanatto and the way in which its
progeny has extended its reasoning regarding impeachment waivers to
allow for rebuttal and case-in-chief waivers. Finally, Part V argues that
32. See Rebbe, 314 F.3d at 406.
33. See Sylvester, 583 F.3d at 291 ("At least four circuits, including the Second, Third,
Seventh, and Ninth, already countenance rebuttal waivers, allowing use of a defendant's plea
statements if the defendant presents any evidence at trial that contradicts his plea statements.").
34. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., Sylvester, 583 F.3d at 289-91 (joining the Eighth and D.C. Circuits in upholding
case-in-chief waivers by extending the Mezzanatto analysis).
2011] 411
HeinOnline  -- 59 U. Kan. L. Rev. 411 2010-2011
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
the Supreme Court's logic in Mezzanatto compels the conclusion that
evidence that defendants rejected favorable plea bargains should be
admissible and that no rule of evidence precludes its admission.
II. THE PASSAGE AND AMENDMENT OF FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE
410 AND FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1 1(E)(6)
A. The Passage of Rules 410 and 11(e)(6)
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure did not have any explicit
provision governing the admissibility of statements made during plea
bargaining when Congress enacted the Rules in 1946.36 In 1975,
Congress finally created Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (e)(6), as
well as the identical Federal Rule of Evidence 41 0.3 Both of these rules
codified common law precedent, which held that withdrawn guilty pleas,
pleas of nolo contendere, and offers to plead guilty and nolo contendere
were inadmissible against an accused. The Advisory Committee's
Note to Rule 410 indicates that the purpose of the Rule was "the
promotion of disposition of criminal cases by compromise."3 9  As
enacted, Rule 410 and Rule 11 (e)(6) stated in relevant part:
[E]vidence of a plea of guilty, later withdrawn, or a plea of nolo
contendere, or of an offer to plead guilty or nolo contendere to the
crime charged or any other crime, or of statements made in connection
with, and relevant to, any of the foregoing pleas or offers, is not
admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who
made the plea or offer.40
B. The 1979 Amendment to Rules 410 and 11(e)(6)
In 1979, Congress amended these Rules with the primary purpose of
clarifying exactly what evidence relating to plea bargaining they render
36. Colin Miller, The Best Offense Is a Good Defense: Why Criminal Defendants' Nolo
Contendere Pleas Should Be Inadmissible Against Them When They Become Civil Plaintiffs, 75 U.
CIN. L. REv. 725, 730 (2006).
37. Id.
38. See FED. R. EVID. 410 advisory committee's note (construing cases such as Gen. Elec. Co.
v. City of San Antonio, 334 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1964) and Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220
(1927)).
39. Id.
40. United States v. Brooks, 536 F.2d 1137, 1138 (6th Cir. 1976) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P.
I 1(e)(6) (1975)), superseded by FED. R. CRIM. P. I1 (e)(6) (1979 amendment).
412 [Vol. 59
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inadmissible.4 1 Specifically, the main purpose of these amendments was
to clarify the term "against" in both Rules. The Advisory Committee
gave the following description of the amendments:
The phrase "in any civil or criminal proceeding" has been moved from
its present position, following the word "against," for purposes of
clarity. An ambiguity presently exists because the word "against" may
be read as referring either to the kind of proceeding in which the
evidence is offered or the purpose for which it is offered. The change
makes it clear that the latter construction is correct.42
In other words, there were two possible constructions of the
preamendment Rules, which deemed inadmissible certain pleas and plea-
related statements "in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person
who made the plea or offer."A3 Under the first construction, these Rules
rendered certain pleas and plea-related statements inadmissible in a
certain kind of proceeding: a proceeding against the defendant making
the plea or plea-related statement." Under this construction, if a
defendant were charged with murder, any exculpatory or incriminatory
statements made by the defendant or the prosecutor during plea
discussions would be inadmissible at the defendant's subsequent criminal
trial or in a civil wrongful death action against him.
Under the second construction, these Rules rendered certain pleas
and plea-related statements inadmissible when offered for a certain
purpose: when offered against the defendant.4 5 Under this construction,
if a defendant were charged with arson, any incriminatory statements
made by the defendant during plea discussions would be inadmissible
against the defendant, whether at the defendant's subsequent criminal
trial, a civil action against the defendant, or a later civil action brought by
the defendant as a civil plaintiff, such as an action against an insurance
company refusing to pay for the fire damage caused by the alleged
arson.4 6  Conversely, under this construction, these Rules would not
render inadmissible otherwise admissible exculpatory statements made
by the defendant or prosecutor during plea discussions in any type of
41. Miller, supra note 36, at 731-32.
42. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
43. Id.
44. Id
45. Id
46. Miller, supra note 36, at 732-33.
2011] 413
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action because they would be admitted on behalf of the defendant, not
against him. 4 7
As noted above, the Advisory Committee concluded that this latter
construction is correct, meaning that the Rules do not restrict a
defendant's ability to admit exculpatory statements made during plea
discussions.4 8 Indeed, ostensibly based upon this clarification, Congress
amended the Rules so that there is an exception under which a statement
is admissible "'in any proceeding wherein another statement made in the
course of the same plea or plea discussions has been introduced and the
statement ought in fairness be considered contemporaneously with it."A 9
According to the Advisory Committee,
[t]his change [was] necessary so that, when evidence of statements
made in the course of or as a consequence of a certain plea or plea
discussions are introduced under circumstances not prohibited by this
rule (e.g., not "against" the person who made the plea), other
statements relating to the same plea or plea discussions may also be
admitted when relevant to the matter at issue. 50
As an example, the Advisory Committee noted that "if a defendant ...
were able to admit certain statements made in aborted plea discussions in
his favor, then other relevant statements made in the same plea
discussions should be admissible against the defendant in the interest of
determining the truth of the matter at issue."51
Former Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (e)(6) is now Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 1(f), 52 and it merely states that "[t]he
admissibility or inadmissibility of a plea, a plea discussion, and any
related statement is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 41 0."53
Meanwhile, Rule 410 now sets forth:
Except as otherwise provided in this rule, evidence of the following is
not, in any civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the
47. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
48. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
49. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee's note (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. Il(e)(6) (1979
amendment)).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(6) (2001) (repealed 2002) (former rule regarding
admissibility of plea discussion), with FED. R. CRIM. P. I 1(f) (current rule regarding admissibility of
plea discussions).
53. FED. R. CRIM. P. I1(f).
414 [Vol. 59
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defendant who made the plea or was a participant in the plea
discussions:
(1) a plea of guilty which was later withdrawn;
(2) a plea of nolo contendere;
(3) any statement made in the course of any proceedings under Rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or comparable state
procedure regarding either of the foregoing pleas; or
(4) any statement made in the course of plea discussions with an
attorney for the prosecuting authority which do not result in a plea of
guilty or which result in a plea of guilty later withdrawn.
However, such a statement is admissible (i) in any proceeding wherein
another statement made in the course of the same plea or plea
discussions has been introduced and the statement ought in fairness be
considered contemporaneously with it, or (ii) in a criminal proceeding
for perjury or false statement if the statement was made by the
defendant under oath, on the record and in the presence of counsel.54
III. COURTS' CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE THAT
DEFENDANTS REJECTED FAVORABLE PLEA BARGAINS
A. United States v. Verdoorn and the Initial Proscription on Evidence
ofRejected Plea Deals
The Eighth Circuit case United States v. Verdoorn was the first case
after the passage of Rules 410 and 11(e)(6) to address the admissibility
of evidence that a defendant rejected a favorable plea bargain. 5 In
Verdoorn, several defendants were charged in connection with a
conspiracy to steal an interstate shipment of beef.56 After conviction,
defendants David and Maynard Verdoorn appealed, claiming that the
district court erred by precluding them from presenting evidence that the
government offered each of the alleged co-conspirators plea deals in
exchange for their testimony.57 According to the defendants, this
evidence would have "challenge[d] the credibility of the government's
54. FED. R. EvID. 410.
55. 528 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1976).
56. Id. at 104.
57. Id. at 107.
4152011]
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entire case, i.e., disclose[d] the lengths to which the government went in
attempting to obtain vital testimony to prosecute its case."ss
The Eighth Circuit disagreed, finding that "[u]nder the rationale of
[Federal Rule of Evidence] 408, which relates to the general
inadmissibility of compromises and offers to compromise, government
proposals concerning pleas should be excludable." 59 At the time, Federal
Rule of Evidence 408 provided:
"Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2)
accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration
in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was
disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove
liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of
conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not
admissible. This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of
compromise negotiations. This rule also does not require exclusion
when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias
or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or
proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. "60
When the Eighth Circuit decided Verdoorn, many courts held that
Rule 408 only governed settlement negotiations between parties in civil
cases based upon the policy that pretrial compromises should be
encouraged in such cases.61 The Eighth Circuit, however, found that the
rationale of Rule 408 extended to criminal cases because of the policy
that plea bargains should be encouraged in such cases.62 According to
the court, "[i]f such a policy is to be fostered, it is essential that plea
negotiations remain confidential to the parties if they are unsuccessful."63
In closing, the court concluded that "[m]eaningful dialogue between the
parties would, as a practical matter, be impossible if either party had to
assume the risk that plea offers would be admissible in evidence."6
Other courts at both the state and federal levels soon fell into
lockstep with the Eighth Circuit, consistently deeming evidence of
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Ramada Dev. Co. v. Rauch, 644 F.2d 1097, 1106 (5th Cir. 1981) (quoting FED. R. EVID.
408 (1981) (amended 2006)).
61. See Miller, supra note 36, at 733 n.47; see also, e.g., United States v. Baker, 926 F.2d 179,
180 (2d Cir. 1991) ("We believe it fairly evident that the Rule applies only to civil litigation.").
62. Verdoorn, 528 F.2d at 107.
63. Id.
64. Id.
416 [Vol. 59
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rejected plea bargains inadmissible but not always for the same reasons.
For instance, in Moss v. State, the Court of Appeals of Texas relied upon
the Rule 408 reasoning of Verdoorn in affirming the trial court's
exclusion of evidence that the defendant, who was convicted of murder
and sentenced to ninety-nine years incarceration, rejected a plea bargain
under which the prosecutor would have recommended only twenty-five
years imprisonment.65 In cases like the Supreme Court of Indiana's
opinion in Wright v. State66 and the opinion of the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois in United States v. Craig,67
courts have found that Rule 410's proscription on the admission of
evidence of statements made during plea discussions "against the
defendant" should also apply to statements presented by the defendant.
And, in cases like Woodsum,6 8 discussed in the Introduction to this
Article, and the Court of Appeals of Ohio's opinion in State v. Davis,69
courts have excluded evidence of rejected favorable plea bargains by
concluding that such evidence fails the balancing test laid out in Federal
Rule of Evidence 403 (and state counterparts), which provides that
"[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."70
In its 1991 opinion in State v. Pearson, the Court of Appeals of Utah
accurately summarized the state of this area of the law by precluding a
defendant from presenting evidence that he rejected a favorable plea
bargain, in the process noting that it had "found no appellate decisions
which have reached a contrary result, given the narrow issue before
65. 860 S.W.2d 194, 196-97 (Tex. App. 1993) (interpreting a state rule of evidence modeled
after Federal Rule of Evidence 408).
66. 363 N.E.2d 1221, 1228 (Ind. 1977) ("We hold that any communication or evidence relating
to plea bargaining negotiations offered in evidence by the defendant is inadmissible unless the
defendant subsequently enters a plea of guilty which is not withdrawn.").
67. No. 87 CR 436-1 & 2, 1987 WL 20415, at *6 (N.D. 111. Oct. 26, 1987) ("As the
government states, such references to plea negotiations are inadmissible against a defendant under
Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence . . .. This Court believes that they should also not be
admissible by a defendant.").
68. See supra notes 1- 16 and accompanying text.
69. 434 N.E.2d 285, 288 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980) ("Stated simply, it is that the probative value, if
any, of evidence relating to settlement negotiations is far outweighed by its possible prejudicial and
misleading effect upon the jury." (citing a state counterpart of FED. R. EVID. 403, OHIO R. EVID.
403)).
70. FED. R. EVID. 403.
2011] 417
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us."7 1 A year earlier, however, the Second Circuit had decided a case
that could have stemmed the tide.
B. United States v. Biaggi and the Admissibility ofEvidence ofRejected
Immunity Deals
In United States v. Biaggi, six defendants, including John Mariotta,
were charged with a variety of state and federal violations in connection
with misconduct allegedly committed at Wedtech Corp., a manufacturing
company that received contracts from the Defense Department.72 The
defendants were convicted and thereafter appealed, with Mariotta
claiming, inter alia, that the district court erred by precluding him from
presenting evidence that he rejected a deal under which he would have
been given immunity in exchange for his testimony against other
Wedtech officers and public officials.73 According to Mariotta, he
rejected this offer of immunity by claiming that he had no knowledge of
any wrongdoing by these officials, making his rejection of the offer
evidence of his "'consciousness of innocence."' 74 The Second Circuit
agreed, concluding that "[t]he available inference is that he really lacked
such knowledge, as he claimed throughout the trial."
The Second Circuit did acknowledge the government's argument
"that evidence of immunity negotiations should be excluded because of
the same considerations that bar evidence of plea negotiations." 76 As a
preliminary note, however, the court advised "that plea negotiations are
inadmissible 'against the defendant,' and it does not necessarily follow
that the Government is entitled to a similar shield."n
The Second Circuit then found, even without this conclusion, that
evidence of an immunity negotiation has more probative value than
evidence of a plea negotiation. On the one hand, "[w]hen a defendant
rejects an offer of immunity on the ground that he is unaware of any
wrongdoing about which he could testify, his action is probative of a
state of mind devoid of guilty knowledge."79 The court did acknowledge
71. 818 P.2d 581, 583 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
72. 909 F.2d 662, 669 (2d Cir. 1990).
73. Id. at 690.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. I1 (e)(6); FED. R. EvID. 410).
78. Id.
79. Id.
418 [Vol. 59
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that "there may be reasons for rejecting the offer that are consistent with
guilty knowledge, such as fear of reprisal from those who would be
inculpated."80  Nonetheless, the Second Circuit found that "a jury is
entitled to believe that most people would jump at the chance to obtain
an assurance of immunity from prosecution and to infer from rejection of
the offer that the accused lacks knowledge of wrongdoing."81 According
to the court, "[t]hat the jury might not draw the inference urged by the
defendant does not strip the evidence of probative force." 82
The court also acknowledged on the other hand that "[r]ejection of
an offer to plead guilty to reduced charges could also evidence an
innocent state of mind."83  The court concluded, though, that "the
inference is not nearly so strong as rejection of an opportunity to
preclude all exposure to a conviction and its consequences." 84 Instead,
"[a] plea rejection might simply mean that the defendant prefers to take
his chances on an acquittal by the jury, rather than accept the certainty of
punishment after a guilty plea."85
But the court then noted that it was not its task to "decide whether a
defendant is entitled to have admitted a rejected plea bargain."86 Instead,
it merely had to resolve the issue of whether a defendant can present
evidence of a rejected immunity offer, and it determined that "[t]he
probative force of a rejected immunity offer is clearly strong enough to
render it relevant [under Federal Rule of Evidence] 401."8 As support
for this determination, the court cited esteemed evidence scholar Dean
Wigmore, who argued:
"Let the accused's whole conduct come in; and whether it tells for
consciousness of guilt or for consciousness of innocence, let us take it
for what it is worth, remembering that in either case it is open to
varying explanations and is not to be emphasized. Let us not deprive
an innocent person, falsely accused, of the inference which common
sense draws from a consciousness of innocence and its natural
manifestations."
80. Id
81. Id.
82. Id. at 690-91.
83. Id. at 691.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 293, at 232 (J. Chadboum rev. ed. 1979)).
4192011]
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The court found that it was a "closer question" whether the district
court abused its discretion by (implicitly) finding that evidence of the
rejected immunity offer failed the balancing test prescribed by Federal
Rule of Evidence 403. In the end, though, the court found such abuse
based upon the high probative value of the evidence and concluded that
"the exclusion of Mariotta's state of mind evidence denied him a fair
trial." 90
Biaggi is ostensibly "the leading case on the issue" of whether
defendants can present evidence that they rejected offers of immunity,
and the Second Circuit's opinion "represents the way most courts handle
the admissibility of evidence of. . . immunity offers and statements made
by the government in discussing such offers."9' For instance, in United
States v. Maloof, the government began building an antitrust case against
Bay Industries, Inc., a company where Mark Maloof worked as the
southern regional sales manager.9 2 In June 1995, governmental officials
twice offered Maloof immunity if he surreptitiously recorded
conversations with his employer and other individuals.93 Maloof
declined these offers of immunity, and in May 1997, he was indicted on
counts of conspiracy to restrain trade and conspiracy to commit wire
fraud.94 At trial, the district court permitted Maloof to testify "to the
substance of the conversations relating to the offers of immunity, his
rejection of the offers and his explanation of lack of knowledge of
wrongdoing."95 The court, however, precluded him from testifying about
"what he considered to be threats and attempted intimidation of him by
the government agents." 96 After he was convicted, Maloof appealed, and
the Fifth Circuit affirmed, concluding
that the trial court correctly applied [Federal Rules of Evidence] 401,
410, and 403 as interpreted in Biaggi by allowing Maloof to testify to
the sum and substance of the offers and rejections of immunity; and did
not abuse its discretion under [Rule] 403 to bar embellishing details on
89. Id.
90. Id
91. Mark T. Pavkov, Note, Closing the Gap: Interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 408 to
Exclude Evidence of Offers and Statements Made by Prosecutors During Plea Negotiations, 57
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 453, 465-66 (2007).
92. 205 F.3d 819, 823 (5th Cir. 2000).
93. Id. at 824-25.
94. Id. at 824.
95. Id. at 825.
96. Id
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the grounds that their probative value was outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion, or delay.97
C. Immune to Biaggi: Courts' Continued Reluctance to Admit Evidence
that Defendants Rejected Favorable Plea Bargains
Biaggi stands for the proposition that a defendant can present
evidence that he rejected an immunity offer, but the Second Circuit left
open the question of whether a defendant can present evidence that he
rejected a plea offer. According to the Second Circuit, evidence that a
defendant rejected a plea bargain is less probative of a defendant's
innocent state of mind than a defendant's rejection of an offer of
immunity.9 8 But is it probative enough to pass the Rule 403 balancing
test? In the wake of Biaggi, no court has answered this question in the
affirmative.
The Second Circuit itself had an opportunity to revisit the issue in its
2001 opinion in United States v. Samaria, which current Supreme Court
Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored.99 In Samaria, Frank Elaiho and
others were indicted on several felony charges based on their alleged
participation in a complex credit card scheme.100 Elaiho rejected a plea
deal under which he would have pleaded guilty to a lesser misdemeanor
charge, and the district judge later prevented him from presenting
evidence of his rejection.10' Elaiho was eventually convicted of
conspiring to receive or possess stolen goods, conspiring to commit
credit card fraud, committing credit card fraud, and aiding and abetting
credit card fraud, felony convictions that would have resulted in his
deportation.102 Elaiho thereafter appealed, claiming, inter alia, that his
convictions were based upon legally insufficient evidence and that the
district court erred in precluding him from presenting evidence that he
rejected the plea deal.10 3 The Second Circuit reversed his convictions,
finding that they were not supported by legally sufficient evidence. 10
97. Id.
98. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
99. 239 F.3d 228 (2d Cir. 2001), abrogated by United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174 (2d Cir.
2008).
100. Id. at 231-32.
101. Id. at 242.
102. Id at 231.
103. Id. at 240-42.
104. Id at 242.
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With regard to Elaiho's plea-related claim, the Second Circuit noted
that "[i]n United States v. Biaggi, . . . we held that there was no per se
bar to the admissibility of evidence that a defendant had rejected the
government's offer of immunity, and assumed that no such bar would
prevent the admission of evidence that a defendant had rejected a plea
bargain."'os Of course, the court also noted that, in Biaggi, "we
remarked that an offer of immunity would generally carry more
evidentiary weight than a rejected plea bargain."' 06 Elaiho's claim was
"that his rejection of the opportunity to plea to a lesser misdemeanor
charge was particularly relevant to and probative of his consciousness of
innocence because accepting such a plea would have prevented his
deportation as a legal permanent resident." 0 7 But because the court had
already decided it was reversing Elaiho's convictions on other grounds, it
found that it did not need to resolve this issue. 0 8
Courts that have resolved this issue, however, have been universally
consistent with pre-Biaggi precedent. Instead of finding that Biaggi
opened the door for defendants admitting evidence that they rejected plea
bargains, courts have used Biaggi's explanation of the differences in
probative value between evidence of rejections of immunity offers and
plea offers to keep the door shut. For instance, in United States v.
Japalucci, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania cited Biaggi for the alleged proposition that a defendant
rejects a plea deal because he "prefers to take his chances on an acquittal
by the jury, rather than accept the certainty of a punishment after a guilty
plea." 09
Other courts have rejected appellants' arguments that Biaggi extends
to evidence of rejected plea bargains and added another reason for
continuing to deem such evidence inadmissible: the rule against hearsay.
In United States v. Greene, the Eighth Circuit rejected the appellant's
citation to Biaggi and went on to find that evidence that he rejected a
plea bargain was merely "a prior statement consistent with his plea of not
guilty."" 0 And according to the court, "[s]uch statements, when offered
by the defendant, are hearsay, except in narrow circumstances not
present here.""' Meanwhile, in United States v. Kemp, the United States
105. Id
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. No. 02:07-cr-363, 2008 WL 1781138, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 17, 2008).
110. 995 F.2d 793, 798 (8th Cir. 1993).
Ill. Id.
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District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania also rejected an
appellant's citation to Biaggi in a case in which the appellant rejected the
government's offer of leniency in exchange for cooperation after
speaking with a lawyer recommended by the FBI.' 12 The court further
noted that "[d]efendants' own assertions of their innocence after they
were confronted are self-serving, hearsay, and not admissible" and that
"[t]hird-party statements"-namely, the statements by the recommended
attorney-"are hearsay and not admissible under [Federal Rule of
Evidence] 803(3)."l 13
IV. UNITED STATES V. MEZZANATTO AND THE ABILITY OF PROSECUTORS
TO FORCE DEFENDANTS TO WAIVE THE PROTECTIONS OF THE PLEA
BARGAINING RULES
A. United States v. Mezzanatto and the Impeachment Waiver
In United States v. Mezzanatto, the Ninth Circuit was confronted
with an issue of first impression: "whether a defendant may waive the
prohibition against the introduction of statements made during plea
negotiations."ll 4 In Mezzanatto, agents arrested Gordon Shuster after
government surveillance detected that he was operating a
methamphetamine laboratory out of his residence.'is Shuster then agreed
to play ball with the agents and called Gary Mezzanatto to set up a drug
buy between Mezzanatto and an undercover officer.1 6  Mezzanatto
subsequently arrived at the buy and presented a brown paper bag with
about one pound of methamphetamine and a glass pipe to the officer and
asked if he wanted to take a "'hit."'"7 The officer gave a prearranged
arrest signal, leading to agents arresting Mezzanatto and the State
charging him with possession of methamphetamine." 8
Mezzanatto and his attorney thereafter asked to meet with the
prosecutor to see if Mezzanatto could also play ball, and the prosecutor
informed them that as a condition to proceeding with a plea meeting,
Mezzanatto "would have to agree that any statements he made during the
meeting could be used to impeach any contradictory testimony he might
112. 362 F. Supp. 2d 591, 594 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
113. Id.
114. 998 F.2d 1452, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 513 U.S. 196 (1995).
115. 513 U.S. at 197.
116. Id. at 197-98.
117. Id. at 198.
118. Id.
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give at trial if the case proceeded that far.""19 Mezzanatto agreed to this
term and began weaving a tale to the prosecutor, initially admitting that
he knew that the bag he tried to sell the officer contained
methamphetamine, "but insist[ing] that he had dealt only in 'ounce'
quantities of methamphetamine prior to his arrest."l 20 Mezzanatto also
asserted "that he was acting merely as a broker for Shuster and did not
know that Shuster was manufacturing methamphetamine at his residence,
but he later conceded that he knew about Shuster's laboratory."l 2 1 Now
clearly grasping at straws, Mezzanatto tried to distance himself from
Shuster by claiming "that he had not visited Shuster's residence for at
least a week before his arrest." 22 The prosecutor responded not with a
plea bargain but with surveillance evidence revealing that Mezzanatto's
car was parked at Shuster's residence a mere day before Mezzanatto's
arrest.12 3  The prosecutor then cut the meeting short because of
Mezzanatto's dishonesty, and the case eventually proceeded to trial.12 4
At trial, Mezzanatto began telling tales again, testifying that he was
not involved in methamphetamine trafficking and that he was unaware
that Shuster was running a meth lab or that the bag he tried to sell to the
agent contained methamphetamine.1 25 Over defense counsel's objection,
the prosecutor proceeded to impeach Mezzanatto through his prior
inconsistent statements during the plea meeting.12 6
After Mezzanatto was convicted, he appealed, claiming, inter alia,
that defendants cannot waive the prohibitions against the introduction of
plea negotiation statements contained in Federal Rule of Evidence 410
and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (e)(6).12 7 The Ninth Circuit
agreed, first noting the importance to both the accused and accuser of
plea bargains: "They allow criminal cases to be resolved in a quick and
cost-effective manner while maintaining the just administration
necessary to the criminal justice system." 2 8
The court then found that the lynchpin of the American plea
bargaining mechanism is the guarantee that a defendant can "maximize
119. Id.
120. Id at 198-99.
121. Id. at 199.
122. Id.
123. Id
124. Id.
125. Id
126. Id
127. United States v. Mezzanatto, 998 F.2d 1452, 1453 (9th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 513 U.S. 196.
128. Id. at 1454.
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what he has 'to sell' with the ability to withdraw from the bargain
proposed by the prosecutor without being harmed by any of his
statements made in the course of an aborted plea bargaining session."1 29
If courts removed this lynchpin by allowing accuseds to waive this
protection, the plea bargaining system might not fall apart, but "candid
and effective plea bargaining could be severely injured."1 3 0 Such a result
would thus be "contrary to all that Congress intended to achieve." 3'
The government thereafter appealed to the United States Supreme
Court, which reversed, finding that criminal defendants may indeed
waive the prohibition against the introduction of plea negotiations
statements.13 2 In an opinion authored by Justice Thomas and joined by
three other Justices, the Court noted that criminal defendants may
voluntarily waive most constitutional protections and statutory
provisions.13 3 The Court then went on to find that its cases interpreting
both the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Rules of Evidence
were consistent with this presumption of waivability, with this
presumption finding "specific application in the context of evidentiary
rules."l 34 The Court held that Mezzanatto bore "the responsibility of
identifying some affirmative basis for concluding that the plea-statement
Rules depart from the presumption of waivability."l 35
Justice Thomas then identified but dismissed three such bases raised
by Mezzanatto in his appeal.' 36 First, Mezzanatto claimed that Rules 410
and 11(e)(6) established an unwaiveable "'guarantee [to] fair
procedure."'l 3 7 The Court actually agreed with Mezzanatto's general
premise that some evidentiary provisions could never be waived by
criminal defendants without "irreparably 'discredit[ing] the federal
courts."" 38 To wit, the Court actually cited to, inter alia, the Seventh
Circuit's opinion in United States v. Josefik, in which Judge Posner
concluded that "'if the parties stipulated to trial by 12 orangutans the
defendant's conviction would be invalid notwithstanding his consent,
because some minimum of civilized procedure is required by community
129. Id. at 1455.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 197.
133. Id. at 197, 201.
134. Id. at 202. For instance, the Court noted that "evidentiary stipulations are a valuable and
integral part of everyday trial practice." Id. at 203.
135. Id. at 204.
136. Id.
137. Id. (alteration in original).
138. Id. (alteration in original).
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feeling regardless of what the defendant wants or is willing to
accept."' 1 3
9
Justice Thomas, however, did not find the waiver of the prohibition
against the introduction of plea negotiation statements analogous to
Judge Posner's "twelve monkeys" hypothetical because "[t]he admission
of plea statements for impeachment purposes enhances the truth-seeking
function of trials and will result in more accurate verdicts."1 40 According
to Justice Thomas, if a defendant such as Mezzanatto made a false
statement either during plea bargaining or at trial, "making the jury
aware of the inconsistency will tend to increase the reliability of the
verdict without risking institutional harm to the federal courts."l 4 1
In this same vein, Mezzanatto tried to analogize Rules 410 and
11 (e)(6) to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c), which at the time
stated that "' [a]n alternate juror who does not replace a regular juror shall
be discharged after the jury retires to consider its verdict."'l 4 2
Mezzanatto noted that Justice Kennedy suggested in his concurrence in
United States v. Olanol43 that the protections of Rule 24(c) can never be
waived by an agreement allowing an alternate juror to sit in on
deliberations, and Mezzanatto argued that the same should apply to
Rules 410 and 1 1(e)(6).144 The Court again disagreed because the plea-
related Rules "provide that statements made in the course of plea
discussions are inadmissible 'against' the defendant, and thus leave open
the possibility that a defendant may offer such statements into evidence
for his own tactical advantage." 45 Indeed, Justice Thomas found that the
Rules do more than leave open this possibility; instead, "the Rules
contemplate this result in permitting admission of statements made 'in
any proceeding wherein another statement made in the course of the
same ... plea discussions has been introduced and the statement ought in
fairness be considered contemporaneously with it."'l 4 6 In summation,
the Court concluded that "the plea-statement Rules expressly
contemplate a degree of party control that is consonant with the
background presumption of waivability."l 47
139. Id. (quoting United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 588 (7th Cir. 1985)).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 205.
142. Id (quoting FED. R. CRiM. P. 24(c) (1987) (amended 1999)) (alteration in original).
143. 507 U.S. 725, 741 (1993) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
144. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 205.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 205-06 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 4 10(i)).
147. Id. at 206.
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Second, Mezzanatto argued that a policy of allowing waiver of the
plea-statement rules could not be reconciled with the main goal of these
rules: encouraging voluntary settlements.148 While the Ninth Circuit had
agreed with this argument, the Supreme Court disagreed, finding that
"[t]he court below focused entirely on the defendant's incentives and
completely ignored the other essential party to the transaction: the
prosecutor." 4 9 Justice Thomas acknowledged on the one hand that "the
availability of waiver may discourage some defendants from
negotiating," but he found on the other that "it is also true that
prosecutors may be unwilling to proceed without it."' 50
Accordingly, the Court held that, "as a logical matter, it simply
makes no sense to conclude that mutual settlement will be encouraged by
precluding negotiation over an issue that may be particularly important to
one of the parties to the transaction."' 5 1 Rather, the Court decided that
"[a] sounder way to encourage settlement is to permit the interested
parties to enter into knowing and voluntary negotiations without any
arbitrary limits on their bargaining chips."'15 2 Borrowing a metaphor
used by the Ninth Circuit in its opinion below, the Court couched the
matter in terms of economics:
[I]f the prosecutor is interested in "buying" the reliability assurance that
accompanies a waiver agreement, then precluding waiver can only
stifle the market for plea bargains. A defendant can "maximize" what
he has to "sell" only if he is permitted to offer what the prosecutor is
most interested in buying. And while it is certainly true that
prosecutors often need help from the small fish in a conspiracy in order
to catch the big ones, that is no reason to preclude waiver altogether. If
prosecutors decide that certain crucial information will be gained only
by preserving the inadmissibility of plea statements, they will agree to
leave intact the exclusionary provisions of the plea-statement Rules. 153
Third, Mezzanatto asserted "that waiver agreements should be
forbidden because they invite prosecutorial overreaching and abuse."' 54
Specifically, he alleged "that there is a 'gross disparity' in the relative
bargaining power of the parties to a plea agreement and suggest[ed] that
148. Id.
149. Id. at 207.
150. Id.
151. Id at 208.
152. Id.
153. Id
154. Id at 209.
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a waiver agreement is 'inherently unfair and coercive.'""5  Justice
Thomas again turned this argument aside, observing that "[t]he dilemma
flagged by [Mezzanatto] [was] indistinguishable from any of a number of
difficult choices that criminal defendants face every day."' 56 According
to Justice Thomas, "[t]he plea bargaining process necessarily exerts
pressure on defendants to plead guilty and to abandon a series of
fundamental rights, but we have repeatedly held that the government
'may encourage a guilty plea by offering substantial benefits in return for
the plea.'" 5 7
In a concurring opinion joined by Justices O'Connor and Breyer,
Justice Ginsburg noted that the Court merely held "that a waiver
allowing the Government to impeach with statements made during plea
negotiations is compatible with Congress' intent to promote plea
bargaining."' 58 She cautioned, though, that "[i]t may be ... that a waiver
to use such statements in the case in chief would more severely
undermine a defendant's incentive to negotiate, and thereby inhibit plea
bargaining."' 59  But because the waiver at issue was not this type of
waiver, she left this issue for another day.160
Meanwhile, in an opinion joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Souter
dissented, expressing Justice Ginsburg's concern in a different manner.
According to Justice Souter, "although the erosion of the Rules has
begun with this trickle, the majority's reasoning will provide no
principled limit to it."16 ' This is because "[t]he Rules draw no distinction
between use of a statement for impeachment and use in the
Government's case in chief." 6 2 Therefore, "[i]f objection can be waived
for impeachment use, it can be waived for use as affirmative evidence,
and if the Government can effectively demand waiver in the former
instance, there is no reason to believe it will not do so just as successfully
in the latter."' 63 Justice Souter then warned that "[w]hen it does, there is
nothing this Court will legitimately be able to do about it." "
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 209-10 (quoting Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219 (1978)).
158. Id. at 211 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 217 (Souter, J., dissenting).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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B. Mezzanatto's Aftermath: Case-in-Chief Waivers and Rebuttal
Waivers
Since Mezzanatto, three circuits have addressed the issue raised by
Justice Ginsburg: whether, as a precondition for plea bargaining, a
prosecutor can force a criminal defendant to sign a waiver allowing for
the use of the defendant's statements during plea negotiations as part of
the prosecution's case-in-chief, regardless of whether the defendant
testifies at trial.165 Each of these circuits, the D.C. Circuit and the Fifth
and Eighth Circuits, have endorsed these types of waivers. 16 6
In the Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Sylvester, Donald Sylvester
voluntarily surrendered after the government obtained an arrest warrant
for him in connection with his alleged killing of a witness for the
prosecution in a federal case involving a large-scale drug conspiracy.16 7
Assistant United States Attorney Martin Landrieu then presented him
with some of the evidence against him, such as an alleged co-conspirator
fingering him as the murderer and cocaine, a newspaper noting the
killing, and rap lyrics describing a similar murder recovered from
Sylvester's car.16 8 Landrieu followed up this presentation with another
vital piece of information: the Attorney General could seek the death
penalty because Sylvester was accused of murdering a federal witness.169
Landrieu then explained that he would ask permission from the Attorney
General to seek life imprisonment but only if Sylvester confessed to the
crime and waived any objection to the admission of his incriminatory
statements, even during the prosecution's case-in-chief, if plea
negotiations failed.170
Sylvester signed the waiver and confessed, and Landrieu made his
promised recommendation.171 Sylvester subsequently had second
thoughts, decided to proceed with trial and requested new, court-
appointed counsel.172 Before that trial, Sylvester moved to suppress his
confession, but the district court enforced his waiver and allowed for the
165. See United States v. Mergen, No. 06-CR-352 (NGG), 2010 WL 395974, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Feb. 3, 2010) (citing United States v. Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Young, 223 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Burch, 156 F.3d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1998)).
166. See id. (noting that each of these circuits have held such "provisions to be enforceable").
167. 583 F.3d at 287.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id
171. Id
172. Id.
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prosecution to use his confession as part of its case-in-chief to procure
Sylvester's conviction.173
Sylvester thereafter appealed, and the Fifth Circuit noted Justice
Ginsburg's concurring opinion in Mezzanatto in which she questioned
whether this broader type of waiver was compatible with Congress'
intent to promote plea bargaining. 17 4  The court then cited Justice
Thomas' rejection of the three bases cited by Mezzanatto for finding that
courts should not allow defendants to waive the plea-statement Rules so
that prosecutors can use their statements during plea negotiations to
impeach their contradictory testimony at trial.175  And just as Justice
Souter feared, the Fifth Circuit approved of the waiver because it could
"find no convincing reason for not extending Mezzanatto's rationale to
this case."l 76
In finding that the rules are waiveable, the Fifth Circuit reiterated the
Supreme Court's points that "[a] defendant may himself introduce his
own plea statements, and indeed, the Rules themselves contemplate such
a result"l 77 and that courts better encourage settlement by allowing both
sides to enter negotiations without arbitrary limits on their bargaining
chips. 78  The court acknowledged that "an innocent defendant might
execute such a waiver (and thus inject false statements into the
admissible record)" but ultimately found that "the benefit of evaluating
as much relevant evidence as possible outweighs the mere possibility of
such danger, and will, on balance, enhance the reliability of a fact-
finder's conclusions." 79
In United States v. Burch, the D.C. Circuit reached the same
conclusion by also extending Justice Thomas' rejection of Mezzanatto's
three proposed bases for precluding impeachment waivers to a
defendant's arguments for precluding case-in-chief waivers. 80 And in
United States v. Young, the Eighth Circuit deemed a case-in-chief waiver
valid under Mezzanatto because it was knowing and voluntary, without
even acknowledging the extension that it had made.' While the First,
Fourth, and Tenth Circuits have not yet addressed the issue of whether
173. Id. at 288.
174. Id. at 289.
175. Id. at 290.
176. Id. at 289.
177. Id at 290 n.20.
178. Id. at 290.
179. Id. at 294.
180. 156 F.3d 1315, 1322-23 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
181. 223 F.3d 905, 911 (8th Cir. 2000).
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defendants can sign case-in-chief waivers, district courts in each of these
circuits have upheld such waivers.1 82
The Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits also
have not yet addressed this issue, but each of these circuits has approved
use of rebuttal waivers.' 8 3  Whereas the impeachment waiver approved
by the Court in Mezzanatto permitted a prosecutor to impeach a
defendant with his statements during plea negotiations if he provided
inconsistent testimony at trial, a rebuttal waiver permits a prosecutor to
use a "defendant's plea statements if the defendant presents any evidence
at trial that contradicts his plea statements."1 84  Exactly "[w]hat
constitutes contradictory evidence varies by circuit and the language of a
particular plea agreement,"' 85 but a couple of examples suffice.
In United States v. Krilich, Robert Krilich was convicted of
conspiracy to violate the Rackateer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Statute and a fraud statute after he allegedly rigged a hole-
in-one contest so that the mayor's son would win.'86 Krilich needed the
support of the mayor of Oakbrook Terrace, Illinois, to procure a bond for
an apartment complex, and Krilich and the mayor came up with an
ingenious plan for Krilich to deliver the bribe to the mayor.'87  Krilich
put on a contest in which a golfer who hit a hole-in-one at the ninth hole
of the Country Lakes Country Club would win a 1931 Cadillac or a
check for $40,000, with the prize to be paid by the National Hole-In-One
Association, which insured the contest.'88  Krilich palmed one of the
son's golf balls, proceeded to the ninth hole, and, after the son hit his
shot, pretended to pull the ball out of the hole.18 9
182. See United States v. DeLaurentiis, 638 F. Supp. 2d 76, 79 (D. Me. 2009); United States v.
Mitchell, No. 2:07-CR-149 TS, 2009 WL 1393138, at *4 (D. Utah May 18, 2009); United States v.
El-Amin, 268 F. Supp. 2d 639, 642 (E.D. Va. 2003). In Mitchell, the United States District Court for
the District of Utah later denied the defendant's motion for continued release pending appeal, noting
the only courts of appeal to address the issue have upheld case-in-chief waivers and that "there [was]
no reason to believe that the Tenth Circuit would depart from the resolution of this issue by other
circuits." United States v. Mitchell, No. 2:07-CR-149 TS, 2009 WL 2852114, at *3 (D. Utah Sept.
1,2009).
183. United States v. Hardwick, 544 F.3d 565, 570 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Artis, 261 F.
App'x 176, 177-79 (1lth Cir. 2008); United States v. Fifer, 206 F. App'x 502, 510 (6th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Velez, 354 F.3d 190, 196-97 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Rebbe, 314 F.3d 402,
407-08 (9th Cir. 2002); United States v. Krilich, 159 F.3d 1020, 1026 (7th Cir. 1998).
184. United States v. Sylvester, 583 F.3d 285, 291 (5th Cir. 2009).
185. Id at 291 n.23.
186. 159 F.3d at 1024.
187. Id
188. Id.
189. Id
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Krilich was later arrested in connection with this fraud and bribery,
and to get to the plea bargaining table, he had to sign a waiver which
provided:
[S]hould [Krilich] subsequently testify contrary to the substance of the
proffer or otherwise present a position inconsistent with the proffer,
nothing shall prevent the government from using the substance of the
proffer at sentencing for any purpose, at trial for impeachment or in
rebuttal testimony, or in a prosecution for perjury.19o
During the ensuing plea negotiations, Krilich admitted, inter alia,
that he "'faked the hole-in-one on the ninth hole.""
After Krilich and the government failed to reach a plea agreement,
the case proceeded to trial, and Krilich neither testified nor called any
witnesses who claimed that Krilich was innocent of the crimes
charged.192 During cross-examination, however, Krilich's attorney got
several witnesses for the prosecution to testify "that the ninth hole at
Country Lakes Country Club is close to the clubhouse and easily
observed," implying that Krilich would not have the courage to plant the
ball.193  During cross-examination, Krilich's attorney also got two
prosecution "witnesses to say that they were at the ninth hole when [the
son] hit the shot but didn't think that Krilich was at the ninth hole
then."l 94 The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois found that by eliciting these and similar responses during cross-
examination, Krilich (through his attorney) had presented a position
inconsistent with his proffer, opening the door for the prosecution to
admit his confession.19 5
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit recognized, regarding the witnesses'
testimony about the ninth hole being easily observed, "Krilich wanted
the jury to infer that no one would attempt to fake a hole-in-one there."196
And according to the court, "that implication [was] inconsistent with the
proffer." 97 Similarly, with regard to the testimony by the two witnesses
who did not think that Krilich was at the ninth hole, the court found that
"[t]heir testimony implied that Krilich did not fake the hole-in-one,
190. Id
191. Id. at 1025.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1026.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id
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contrary to what he admitted in his proffer."' 98 The Seventh Circuit thus
affirmed Krilich's conviction because he presented positions inconsistent
with his proffer.'99
In United States v. Barrow, the Second Circuit was presented with a
slightly different waiver.20 0 In Barrow, the defendant signed a waiver
that allowed the prosecution to use his proffer statements "'to rebut any
evidence offered or elicited, or factual assertions made, by or on behalf
of [him] at any stage of a criminal prosecution."' 20 1 According to the
Second Circuit, "[flactual assertions made by a defendant's counsel in an
opening argument or on cross-examination plainly fall within this broad
language," opening the door for admission of a defendant's proffer.202
And like the Seventh Circuit in Krilich, the Second Circuit found that
waiver occurs even when defense counsel merely asserts facts implicitly
rather than directly.203
V. DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE ABLE TO PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT THEY
REJECTED FAVORABLE PLEA BARGAINS
A. Rule 410 Should Not Cut Both Ways
As already noted, some courts have precluded defendants from
presenting evidence that they rejected favorable plea bargains by holding
that Rule 410's proscription on the admission of evidence of statements
made during plea discussions "against the defendant" should also apply
to statements presented by the defendant.204 Also, all federal appellate
courts have allowed case-in-chief or rebuttal waivers by extending
Justice Thomas's three prong analysis from Mezzanatto.205  Justice
Thomas's analysis, however, also makes clear that lower courts cannot
continue to preclude defendants from presenting evidence that they
rejected favorable plea bargains under Rule 410.
Justice Thomas first rejected Mezzanatto's assertion that the plea-
related rules establish an unwaiveable "'guarantee [to] fair
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. 400 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2005).
201. Id.atll6.
202. Id at 118.
203. Id. at 119.
204. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
205. See supra Part IV.B.
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procedure."'206 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Thomas relied upon
the fact that Rules 410 and 1 1(e)(6) "provide that statements made in the
course of plea discussions are inadmissible 'against' the defendant, and
thus leave open the possibility that a defendant may offer such
statements into evidence for his own tactical advantage."207 Justice
Thomas then went further, finding that "the Rules contemplate this result
in permitting admission of statements made 'in any proceeding wherein
another statement made in the course of the same . .. plea discussions
has been introduced and the statement ought in fairness be considered
contemporaneously with it."' 20 8  He then concluded that "the plea-
statement Rules expressly contemplate a degree of party control that is
consonant with the background presumption of waivability."209
It is unsurprising that Justice Thomas reached these conclusions in
Mezzanatto. As noted, Congress amended Rules 410 and I 1(e)(6) in
1979 to make clear the rules do not apply to evidence offered by
defendants and to create the fairness exception mentioned by Justice
Thomas in Mezzanatto.210
Congress amended the Rules based upon the recognition that they
allow for the admission of evidence of plea discussions as long as they
are not admitted "against the defendant." 211 And the Supreme Court
found that impeachment waivers are valid in large part based upon the
recognition that the Rules contemplate the defendant admitting
statements made during plea discussions for his tactical advantage. 2 12 So
where is the party control expressly contemplated by the Rules and the
Supreme Court? According to courts finding that the plea-related Rules
cut both ways, defendants lack this control-a result plainly at odds with
Mezzanatto, the texts of the Rules, and their legislative histories.
Second, Justice Thomas rejected Mezzanatto's claim that allowing
waiver of the plea-statement Rules could not be reconciled with the goal
of encouraging voluntary settlements.2 13 The Ninth Circuit had accepted
this argument, but Justice Thomas disagreed, finding that "[the court
below focused entirely on the defendant's incentives and completely
206. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 204 (1995) (alteration in original).
207. Id. at 205.
208. Id. at 205-06 (quoting FED. R. EVID. 410(i)).
209. Id. at 206.
210. See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
212. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 148-53 and accompanying text.
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ignored the other essential party to the transaction: the prosecutor."214
The Court concluded that, "as a logical matter, it simply makes no sense
to conclude that mutual settlement will be encouraged by precluding
negotiation over an issue that may be particularly important to one of the
parties to the transaction."2 15 Instead, the Court decided that "[a] sounder
way to encourage settlement is to permit the interested parties to enter
into knowing and voluntary negotiations without any arbitrary limits on
their bargaining chips."216
Courts concluding that Rule 410 cuts both ways make the opposite
mistake by focusing entirely on the prosecutor's incentives and
completely ignoring the other essential party to the transaction: the
defendant. Of course, the prosecution would prefer that evidence that a
defendant rejected a favorable plea bargain be inadmissible. 2 17 But as the
aforementioned cases illustrate, 21 8 a defendant would just as clearly
prefer having the option of presenting evidence that he rejected such a
deal to prove his innocent state of mind, the weakness of the
prosecution's case, or both. Under Justice Thomas's analysis in
Mezzanatto, the sounder way to encourage settlement is not to create an
arbitrary limit on the plea-related Rules so that they render evidence of
plea discussions inadmissible against both the defendant and the
prosecution. Instead, it is more sensible to recognize that the Rules
permit defendants to present evidence that they rejected plea agreements
and to allow them to use this ability as a bargaining chip during the plea
bargaining process. This was the very argument presented by the
defendant in Woodsum, discussed in the Introduction to this Article,219
and courts' repeated rejection of this argument cannot be reconciled with
Mezzanatto.
Moreover, courts would need to do more than reconcile this rejection
with Mezzanatto. In Mezzanatto, four Justices approved of impeachment
214. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 206.
215. Id. at 208.
216. Id
217. But see Brooks v. State, 763 So. 2d 859 (Miss. 2000). In Brooks, the prosecution presented
evidence that the defendant rejected a plea bargain. Id. at 862-63. After he was convicted, the
defendant appealed, and the Supreme Court of Mississippi noted that neither side cited to "any cases
in which the prosecution sought to introduce evidence that a defendant rejected a plea bargain." Id.
at 863-64. Nonetheless, relying upon cases in which courts precluded defendants from presenting
evidence that they rejected plea deals, the court found that prosecutors also cannot present such
evidence and reversed the defendant's conviction. Id. at 864.
218. See supra Parts II.A, C.
219. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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waivers while two Justices dissented.2 20 The controlling opinion in that
case was thus the concurring opinion written by Justice Ginsburg and
joined by two other Justices. And as noted, Justice Ginsburg clarified
that the Court merely held "that a waiver allowing the Government to
impeach with statements made during plea negotiations is compatible
with Congress' intent to promote plea bargaining." 2 2 1 She then cautioned
that "[i]t may be. . . that a waiver to use such statements in the case in
chief would more severely undermine a defendant's incentive to
negotiate, and thereby inhibit plea bargaining." 222
In other words, the Court did not address the issue of whether
rebuttal waivers are compatible with the congressional intent to promote
plea bargaining, and the Court called into serious question the issue of
whether case-in-chief waivers are compatible with that intent. And yet,
as noted, every federal appellate court to address each of these types of
waivers has upheld them against constitutional scrutiny.223 Given that
courts categorically have thrown the concurrence's caution to the wind in
extending Mezzanatto, it is difficult to see how they can continue to
prevent defendants from presenting evidence that they rejected favorable
plea deals on the theory that it might inhibit plea bargaining.
Third, Justice Thomas rejected Mezzanatto's argument "that waiver
agreements should be forbidden because they invite prosecutorial
overreaching and abuse."2 24 Justice Thomas turned this argument aside,
finding that "[t]he plea bargaining process necessarily exerts pressure on
defendants to plead guilty and to abandon a series of fundamental rights,
but we have repeatedly held that the government 'may encourage a guilty
plea by offering substantial benefits in return for the plea."' 2 25 If the
pressure exerted on defendants in the plea bargaining process is not
enough to preclude prosecutors from being able to force defendants to
sign waivers of their rights under the plea-related Rules, then, at worst,
such pressure does not present a reason for excluding evidence that
defendants rejected favorable plea bargains. Moreover, it is at least
arguable that this pressure provides some support for the argument that
defendants should be able to present such evidence given the power
disparity between prosecutors and defendants.
220. See supra notes 133 and 161 and accompanying text.
221. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 211 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
222. Id.
223. See supra Part IV.B.
224. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 209.
225. Id. at 209-10 (quoting Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219 (1978)).
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In summation, each of the three prongs of Justice Thomas'
Mezzanatto analysis supports the admission of evidence that defendants
rejected favorable plea bargains at least to the same extent as evidence
admitted pursuant to impeachment waivers. And each of these prongs
supports the admission of such evidence to a greater extent than evidence
admitted pursuant to rebuttal and case-in-chief waivers. Thus, unless
some rule besides Rule 410 compels the exclusion of such evidence,
courts cannot consistently preclude defendants from presenting evidence
that they rejected favorable plea bargains while admitting evidence under
such impeachment, rebuttal, and case-in-chief waivers.
B. The Rule Against Hearsay Should Not Prevent the Introduction of
Evidence that a Defendant Rejected a Favorable Plea Bargain
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) provides that "'[h]earsay' is a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted." 226 In addition, Federal Rule of Evidence 802 indicates that
"[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other
rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or
by Act of Congress." 2 27 As noted, according to some courts, plea offers
by prosecutors and the rejections of those offers by defendants constitute
inadmissible hearsay.2 2 8
Both of these types of statements do meet the Rule 801(c) definition
of hearsay. With regard to a plea offer, the offer is a statement made by
the declarant-the prosecutor-while not testifying at a trial or hearing,
offered in evidence by the defendant to prove the truth of the matter
asserted: that the prosecution made a favorable plea offer, which implies
that the State thought that it had a weak case. With regard to the
defendant's rejection, the rejection is a statement made by the
declarant-the defendant-while not testifying at a trial or hearing,
offered in evidence by the defendant to prove the truth of the matter
asserted: that he rejected a favorable plea offer, which implies that he
had an innocent state of mind.
Despite Rule 801(c), however, Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(A) provides that "[a] statement is not hearsay if. . . [t]he
statement is offered against a party and is ... the party's own statement,
226. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
227. FED. R. EVID. 802.
228. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
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in either an individual or a representative capacity." 22 9  Furthermore,
Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(B) provides that "[a] statement is not
hearsay if ... [t]he statement is offered against a party and is .. . a
statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its
truth."230
Under these Rules, it is well established that a civil plaintiff may
admit a statement made or adopted by a civil defendant,2 31 a civil
defendant may admit a statement made or adopted by a civil plaintiff,232
and a prosecutor may admit a statement made or adopted by a criminal
defendant. 2 33  The statement does not have to resemble a traditional
admission; if a party-opponent made or adopted a statement and the
other party can establish the "requisite foundation," that party may admit
it.2 34  But can a criminal defendant admit a statement made by a
prosecutor?
The issue of whether criminal defendants can admit such "statements
as admissions of party opponents has been controversial, provoking a
split among the circuits."235 While courts used to rule against criminal
defendants on this issue, "'relatively recently several federal courts have
endorsed generally the use of inconsistent prosecutorial statements in
concluding they are not per se inadmissible."' 2 36 According to these
courts, prosecutors' statements are either admissions of prosecutors in
their capacity as representatives of the government under Rule
801(d)(2)(A) or admissions adopted by the government under Rule
801 (d)(2)(B).237
Some of these courts, however, hold that criminal defendants can
only admit prosecutors' statements if they are assertions of fact
equivalent to a testimonial statement, inconsistent with similar assertions
in a subsequent trial, and not subject to an innocent explanation for the
229. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A).
230. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B).
231. See, e.g., Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 77 (2d Cir. 2006).
232. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Modem Handling Equip. of NJ, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 2d 612, 622
(S.D.N.Y. 2009).
233. See, e.g., United States v. DiSantis, 565 F.3d 354, 360 (7th Cir. 2009).
234. See, e.g., Guest v. Allstate Ins. Co., 205 P.3d 844, 861 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009) (noting that a
party may introduce an adverse party's statement as an admission as long as it is in some way
relevant), af'd in part, rev'd in part, 244 P.3d 342 (N.M. 2010).
235. United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 648 F. Supp. 2d 241, 246 (D.P.R. 2009).
236. Id (quoting State v. Pearce, No. 30502, 2007 WL 1544152, at *11 (Idaho Ct. App. May 30,
2007).
237. Id. at 246-47.
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inconsistency.2 38 Under this test, a prosecutor's plea offer would not be
an assertion of fact. And while prosecuting a defendant for a more
severe crime after offering the defendant an opportunity to plead guilty
to a less serious crime could be seen as inconsistent with assertions at
trial, the prosecutor could easily explain the inconsistency based upon
the way that the plea bargaining process works. Therefore, in these
courts, the admission Rules would not allow defendants to present
evidence of prosecutors' plea offers. Other courts, however, "have
adopted a more permissive approach to the admission of prosecutorial
statements by conducting a simple F.R.E. 801(d)(2) analysis without also
applying [these] .. . factors."239 In these courts, defendants should be
able to admit evidence of prosecutors' plea offers as admissions.
Conversely, a defendant's rejection of a plea offer would not be
admissible as an admission because it would be the defendant seeking to
admit his own statement. The aforementioned opinion in United States
v. Kemp, however, indirectly indicates how both a prosecution's plea
offer and a defendant's rejection of it are admissible notwithstanding the
rule against hearsay. 240 As noted, in Kemp, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, inter alia, precluded a
defendant from presenting evidence concerning statements that a lawyer
recommended by the FBI made to him regarding an offer of leniency in
exchange for cooperation.24 1 In deeming this evidence inadmissible, the
court found that "[t]hird-party statements .. . are hearsay and not
admissible under [Federal Rule of Evidence] 803(3)."242
This conclusion is actually inaccurate, and Federal Rule of Evidence
803(3) explains how both a prosecutor's plea offer and a defendant's
rejection of it are admissible. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3) provides
an exception to the rule against hearsay for
[a] statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion,
sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design,
mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement
of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed unless it
relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or terms of
declarant's will.243
238. Pearce, 2007 WL 1544152, at *11.
239. Id. at *I n.8.
240. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
242. United States v. Kemp, 362 F. Supp. 2d 591, 594 (E.D. Pa. 2005).
243. FED. R. EVID. 803(3).
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While the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that Rule 803(3)
does not cover third-party statements in Kemp,24 it reached the opposite
conclusion in Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. BC-USA, Inc.2 45 In BC-USA,
Kraft General Foods, Inc., which manufactures "Philadelphia" cream
cheese, brought a trademark infringement action against a company
which manufactured "Pennsylvania" cream cheese and had a pending
trademark registration for "Pennsylvania" in Argentina.246 At trial,
[d]uring the direct examination of Jorge Bertran-Guzman, Kraft
Argentina's General Manager of Business Affairs, Kraft sought to
introduce evidence of actual customer confusion.... Bertran recounted
his observations of customers in an Argentine supermarket choosing
packages of both Philadelphia brand and Pennsylvania brand cream
cheese, or choosing Pennsylvania brand and then returning to exchange
it for Philadelphia brand. Bertran reported that one customer told him
that he thought the two brands were different versions made by the
same company. Another customer said that he had picked up the
Pennsylvania packages by mistake because the two brands were on the
same shelf and both had silver packaging. 247
The court found "that Bertran's testimony about customers he
observed and their statements to him [were] admissible under the state of
mind exception to the hearsay rule."2 4 8 In support of this conclusion, the
court cited precedent from across the country for the proposition that
statements showing the declarant's then-existing state of mind are
admissible as long as they are "relevant to the case." 24 9 The court then
found that the subject statements were relevant to the case because
"likelihood of customer confusion is a key element" in a trademark
infringement action, rendering Bertran's testimony "admissible under the
803(3) exception because it [was] indicative of the customers' then-
existing confused state of mind." 25 0
Additionally, courts consistently have found that Rule 803(3) allows
for the admission of statements by customers explaining why they ceased
dealing with a business. For instance, in Celebrity Cruises Inc. v. Essef
Corp., a cruise line brought an action against a whirlpool spa
manufacturer after passengers contracted Legionnaires' Disease from the
244. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
245. 840 F. Supp. 344, 348 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
246. Id. at 346.
247. Id. at 347-48.
248. Id. at 348.
249. Id.
250. Id.
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company's spa on the cruise line and successfully sued the cruise line for
negligence.2 51 In this latter action, the cruise line sought damages for lost
profits, and the cruise line tried to present testimony that customers
indicated that they stopped buying tickets for the cruise line based upon
the Legionnaires' Disease incident.25 2  The United States Southern
District of New York allowed such testimony, citing several prior
opinions for the proposition that "testimony concerning the motivation of
customers for ceasing to deal with a business is admissible under the
state of mind exception to the hearsay rule, Rule 803(3) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence." 253
If statements by third-parties-customers--concerning their reasons
for ceasing to deal with companies are admissible under Rule 803(3),
then surely statements by parties-defendants-concerning their reasons
for ceasing to deal with prosecutors are also admissible under the Rule.
All that is required for a defendant to be able to present evidence that he
rejected a favorable plea bargain despite the rule against hearsay is that
his state of mind be "relevant to the case."254 As noted, United States v.
Biaggi is "the leading case on the issue" of whether defendants can
present evidence that they rejected offers of immunity.255 And in Biaggi,
in reversing the defendant's conviction based upon the district court's
exclusion of the defendant's rejection of such an offer, the Second
Circuit relied upon the fact that "[w]here evidence of a defendant's
innocent state of mind, critical to a fair adjudication of criminal charges,
is excluded, we have not hesitated to order a new trial."256 In other
words, evidence of a defendant's innocent state of mind is highly
relevant to his defense.
The numerous circumstances in which courts allow evidence
establishing defendants' consciousness of guilt further underscore the
relevance of evidence of a defendant's state of mind. For instance, it is
well established that evidence that a defendant fled from a police
officer257 or used false identification 2 58 is relevant and admissible to
show the defendant's consciousness of guilt. It is also well established
251. 478 F. Supp. 2d 440,442-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
252. Id. at 447.
253. Id.
254. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
255. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
256. 909 F.2d 662, 692 (2d Cir. 1990).
257. See, e.g., United States v. Blakey, 960 F.2d 996, 1000 (1lth Cir. 1992) ("Evidence of flight
is admissible to demonstrate consciousness of guilt and thereby guilt.").
258. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 11 F.3d 346, 353 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Moreover, the use of
false identification is relevant and admissible to show consciousness of guilt . . . .").
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that "[e]vidence of a threat by a defendant respecting a specific adverse
witness indicates that the defendant was conscious of the weakness of his
case" and that "such evidence creates a compelling inference that the
defendant's case lacks merit." 2 59
This latter point also explains why favorable plea offers by
prosecutors are admissible under Rule 803(3): such an offer reveals that
the prosecutor was conscious of the weakness of his case.260 And just as
courts have recognized the relevance and admissibility of evidence
relating to a defendant's state of mind, courts have recognized the
relevance and admissibility of evidence relating to a prosecutor's state of
mind. For example, courts have found that defendants can present
evidence "relating to the delay in the commencement of the prosecution
against them as an implied admission by conduct on the part of the
State's witnesses that they were conscious of the weakness of the State's
case against the defendants."2 61
C. Rule 408 Should Not Bar Admission ofEvidence ofRejected Plea
Bargains
As noted, while there is a split among courts,262 some courts hold
that the rationale of Federal Rule of Evidence 408, which governs
settlement negotiations between parties in civil cases, should be extended
to criminal cases, meaning that "government proposals concerning pleas
should be excludable."263 Whatever the validity of this position before
2006, it is now clear that Rule 408 no longer provides a defensible
rationale for excluding evidence that a defendant rejected a favorable
plea bargain.
The civil negotiations most analogous to plea negotiations are civil
negotiations between a private citizen and a government regulatory,
investigative, or enforcement agency. Before 2006, "federal appellate
courts were sharply divided over whether in criminal cases Rule 408
required the exclusion of statements made in compromise negotiations
over civil claims." 26 At this point, many courts found that Rule 408's
exclusionary rationale applied to evidence that a defendant rejected a
259. United States v. Rocha, 916 F.2d 219, 241 (5th Cir. 1990).
260. See infra Part V.D.
261. State v. Black, 53 S.E.2d 443, 445 (N.C. 1949).
262. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
263. United States v. Verdoom, 528 F.2d 103, 107 (8th Cir. 1976).
264. Robert A. Weninger, Amended Federal Rule of Evidence 408: Trapping the Unwary, 26
REv. LITIG. 401, 417 (2007).
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favorable plea bargain because "[m]eaningful dialogue between the
parties would, as a practical matter, be impossible if either party had to
assume the risk that plea offers would be admissible in evidence."2 65
To the extent that these courts also held that Rule 408 required the
exclusion in criminal cases of statements made in civil negotiations
between a private citizen and a government regulatory, investigative, or
enforcement agency, there was a certain symmetry to their approach.
Rule 408 required such exclusion because otherwise meaningful dialogue
and settlement between a private citizen and an agency would be
practically impossible if the citizen had to assume the risk that his
statements would be admissible against him in a subsequent criminal
prosecution. Similarly, Rule 408's rationale required exclusion of
evidence of a defendant's rejection of a favorable plea bargain because
otherwise meaningful dialogue and plea agreement between a criminal
defendant and the prosecution would be practically impossible if the
prosecution had to assume the risk that its offer (and the defendant's
rejection) would be admissible if the case proceeded to trial.
In 2006, however, Congress amended Rule 408. The Rule now
deems inadmissible "conduct or statements made in compromise
negotiations regarding [a] claim, except when offered in a criminal case
and the negotiations related to a claim by a public office or agency in the
exercise of regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority."266 The
accompanying Advisory Committee's Note indicates that "the
amendment provides that Rule 408 does not prohibit the introduction in a
criminal case of statements or conduct during compromise negotiations
regarding a civil dispute by a government regulatory, investigative, or
enforcement agency."267
As support for this conclusion, the Advisory Committee cited to the
Seventh Circuit's opinion in United States v. Prewitt.2 68 In Prewitt, the
Securities Division of the Indiana Secretary of State's Office began an
investigation of Sterling American Financial Group, Inc.269 Sterling
thereafter began settlement and compromise efforts with the Security
Division, during which Security Division investigators twice interviewed
265. Verdoorn, 528 F.2d at 107.
266. FED. R. EVID. 408(a)(2) (emphasis added).
267. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note.
268. Id. (citing United States v. Prewitt, 34 F.3d 436, 439 (7th Cir. 1994)).
269. Prewitt, 34 F.3d at 438.
4432011])
HeinOnline  -- 59 U. Kan. L. Rev. 443 2010-2011
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
Jack V. Smillie, Sterling's founder.270 More than two years later, Smillie
was indicted on five counts of mail fraud.27 1
After Smillie was convicted, his principal contention on appeal was
that the district court violated Federal Rule of Evidence 408 by allowing
the prosecution to present into evidence statements that he made to
Securities Division investigators during compromise negotiations.27 2 The
Seventh Circuit responded that "[t]he clear reading of this rule suggests
that it should apply only to civil proceedings, specifically the language
concerning validity and amount of a claim."273 It continued that
"[n]othing in Rule 408 specifically prohibits the receipt of evidence in
criminal proceedings concerning the admissions and statements made at
,,274a conference to settle claims of private parties. Thus, the court
concluded that "Rule 408 should not be applied to criminal cases."275
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit found that "Rule I1 (e)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure [was] of no help to this defendant. It
applies to the inadmissibility of pleas, plea discussions, and related
statements in criminal cases." 27 6
After its citation to Prewitt, the Advisory Committee noted that
"[w]here an individual makes a statement in the presence of government
agents, its subsequent admission in a criminal case should not be
unexpected." 2 7 7 The Committee further found that "[t]he individual can
seek to protect against subsequent disclosure through negotiation and
agreement with the civil regulator or an attorney for the government." 27 8
The Committee then concluded by noting:
Statements made in compromise negotiations of a claim by a
government agency may be excluded in criminal cases where the
circumstances so warrant under Rule 403. For example, if an
individual was unrepresented at the time the statement was made in a
civil enforcement proceeding, its probative value in a subsequent
criminal case may be minimal. But there is no absolute exclusion
imposed by Rule 408.279
270. Id.
271. Id. at 437.
272. Id. at 439.
273. Id
274. Id. (citing United States v. Gonzalez, 748 F.2d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1984)).
275. Id (citing United States v. Baker, 926 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1991)).
276. Id.
277. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note.
278. Id.
279. Id
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In other words, Congress found that meaningful dialogue and
settlement between a private citizen and an agency is practically
possible, despite the citizen having to assume the risk that his statements
will be admissible against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, it found that Rule 408 does not apply to the civil
negotiations most analogous to plea negotiations.280 In effect, Congress
used the same logic as Justice Thomas in Mezzanatto. As noted, in
Mezzanatto, Justice Thomas rejected the argument that the plea-related
Rules are nonwaiveable because "[a] sounder way to encourage
settlement is to permit the interested parties to enter into knowing and
voluntary negotiations without any arbitrary limits on their bargaining
chips."281
In other words, according to Justice Thomas, while the plea-related
Rules preclude prosecutors from admitting evidence of a defendant's
statements made during plea discussions, prosecutors can force
defendants to waive the protections of these rules. Meanwhile, according
to Congress, while Rule 408 does not preclude prosecutors from
admitting evidence of a defendant's statements made during civil
negotiations between the defendant and an agency, defendants can
negotiate with the civil regulator or an attorney for the government to
have these statements deemed inadmissible. This was the same
reasoning advocated by the defendant in Woodsum-while the plea-
related Rules do not preclude defendants from admitting evidence that a
defendant rejected a favorable plea bargain, prosecutors negotiate with
the defendant to have these rejections deemed inadmissible.282 Based on
Congress's incorporation of Justice Thomas's analysis in Mezzanatto
into Rule 408, courts can no longer rely upon Rule 408 to preclude
evidence that defendants rejected favorable plea bargains. Instead, as the
Advisory Committee noted, Rule 403 should present the only possible
bar against the introduction of such rejections.283
D. Evidence that a Defendant Rejected a Favorable Plea Bargain
Passes the Rule 403 Balancing Test
As noted, some courts have found that evidence that a defendant
rejected a favorable plea bargain is inadmissible because it fails the
280. See id.
281. United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 208 (1995).
282. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
283. FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee's note.
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balancing test set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 403,284 which
provides that "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." 28 5 Conversely, as noted, most courts have adopted
the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Biaggi and have found that
evidence that a defendant rejected an offer of immunity is admissible and
passes the Rule 403 balancing test.286 This Section argues that evidence
of rejected plea bargains fares at least as well as evidence of rejected
offers of immunity under the Rule 403 balancing test, meaning that
courts should similarly deem this former type of evidence admissible.
First, evidence that a prosecutor offered a favorable plea bargain to a
defendant has significant probative value for establishing the weakness
of the prosecution's case. It is well established that "[t]he overwhelming
majority of prosecutors view the strength or weakness of the state's case
as the most important factor in the task of bargaining." 2 87 Indeed, "a
number of studies have identified the strength of the evidence as one of
the primary influences on prosecutors' plea bargaining decisions. 2 88 For
instance,
[a] 1964 article cited with approval in the Advisory Committee
Notes to the 1974 amendments reported that 85% of the prosecutors
surveyed, representing 31 states, were influenced by weaknesses in the
government's case; 60% were influenced by the victims' preferences;
36.7% by their office's heavy workload; 31.7% by the fact that the
penalties the defendant faced were too harsh; and 26.7% by sympathy
for the defendant.289
In light of this data, evidence of a favorable plea offer by a
prosecutor has significant probative value for establishing the weakness
of the prosecution's case. While other factors may play a role in a
284. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
285. FED. R. EVID. 403.
286. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
287. Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 50, 58
(1968); see also Russell D. Covey, Signaling and Plea Bargaining's Innocence Problem, 66 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 73, 77 n.14 (2009) ("Given any initial charge carrying a standard sentence upon
conviction, the primary pricing variable is the strength of the evidence in the case.").
288. Margareth Etienne & Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ.
L. REv. 295, 318 (2007).
289. John Gleeson, The Sentencing Commission and Prosecutorial Discretion: The Role of the
Courts in Policing Sentence Bargains, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 639, 642 n. 10 (2008).
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prosecutor offering a favorable plea bargain to a defendant, the above
data reveal that nearly every prosecutor is influenced by the weakness of
the prosecution's case in making a plea offer. 29 0 And "if we assume that
prosecutors are motivated by a desire to avoid acquittals, they are likely
to adjust their plea offers so as to create the largest differentials in cases
where the government evidence is weakest." 2 9 1 Put another way, "the
more likely it is that a defendant will be acquitted, the more attractive the
plea offer that he will receive. Thus, for example, defendants with
colorable claims for evidentiary exclusions will be offered greater
concessions than similarly situated defendants without such claims."292
Indeed, some courts have acknowledged the probative value of such
evidence while still deeming it inadmissible. In Woodsum, discussed in
the Introduction to this Article, the defendant claimed that the trial court
erred in excluding evidence that he rejected a favorable plea bargain
because it was evidence of his innocent state of mind.293 The Supreme
Court of New Hampshire, however, rejected his appeal, concluding that
"[a]n 'extraordinarily beneficial' plea offer is especially likely to induce
a defendant to risk a trial, regardless of his or her guilt or innocence, for
the offer of a beneficial plea may indicate that there are problems with
the State's case." 2 94 The court's former conclusion is debatable, 295 but it
seems clear that evidence of rejection of a favorable plea bargain has
significant probative value for establishing the weakness of the
prosecution's case.
Conversely, an offer of immunity has little probative value for
establishing the weakness of the prosecution's case against the person
being offered immunity. Prosecutors offer immunity "to preclude a
witness's reliance on his fifth amendment [sic] privilege against
compelled self-incrimination." 296  And while there are no studies
uncovering the reasons why prosecutors offer immunity, the Seventh
Circuit in United States v. Palumbo noted that "[p]romises of immunity
are important weapons in the fight against large-scale criminal
enterprises; the government often snares big fish with information gained
290. See id
291. Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of
Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 436, 476 (1980).
292. Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining ofInternational
Crimes, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 26 (2002).
293. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
294. State v. Woodsum, 624 A.2d 1342, 1344 (N.H. 1993).
295. See infra notes 305-13 and accompanying text.
296. United States v. Harvey, 869 F.2d 1439, 1445 (11th Cir. 1989).
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from little fish. In return, the little fish are granted immunity from
prosecution based upon the information they provide to the
government." 297
Indeed, "[e]ffective prosecution of conspiracies often entails the
investigative tactic known as 'ladder climbing': less culpable
conspirators are immunized, often after being convicted themselves, in
order to compel their testimony against more culpable coconspirators." 298
Moreover, "[i]n cases in which the 'ladder climbing' tactic is frequently
employed, such as corporate conspiracies and racketeering, the
prosecution's evidence may consist almost entirely of testimony by those
implicated in the crime."2 99
In other words, a prosecutor's offer of immunity is typically based
upon the prosecution having a weak case against someone other than the
person to whom they are offering immunity. The fact that a prosecutor
offered an individual immunity thus says nothing about the strength of
the prosecution's case against the offeree; it merely reveals that the
prosecutor thinks that the offeree can incriminate someone more
important but that the prosecutor fears that the offeree will refuse to do
so unless offered immunity. Indeed, as noted above, it is not uncommon
for prosecutors to offer immunity against those who have already been
convicted of some crime.3 00
A prosecutor's offer of a favorable plea bargain thus clearly is more
probative than a prosecutor's offer of immunity on the issue of the
weakness of the prosecution's case. But is the inverse true with regard to
how probative rejections of the two types of offers are on the issue of the
defendant's innocent state of mind? Again, as noted, the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire in Woodsum found that a defendant's rejection of a
favorable plea offer is not especially indicative of his innocent state of
mind because the offer reveals the weakness in the State's case and
makes the defendant especially likely to risk trial.30 ' But is this actually
true?
First, it seems safe to assume that "factually innocent defendants
tend to have stronger cases than those who are guilty," meaning that it is
"innocent defendants [who] typically receive especially attractive plea
297. 897 F.2d 245, 246 (7th Cir. 1990).
298. Comment, Defense Witness Immunity and the Right to a Fair Trial, 129 U. PA. L. REv.
377, 395-96 (1980).
299. Id. at 396.
300. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
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offers."302 Thus, the mere existence of a favorable plea offer is some
evidence of an innocent state of mind by the defendant. But is the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire correct that defendants given such
favorable offers are especially likely to risk trial?
It is well established that guilty defendants "as a class are unusually
prone to risk taking" because "a criminal history suggests a preference
for gambling, just as it suggests that the defendant fears punishment less
than most people."303 Conversely, "risk aversion is a much more
plausible assumption where innocent defendants are concerned
(especially those with relatively clean records)." 3 M Therefore,
"[c]ritics . .. claim that plea bargaining coerces a significant percentage
of innocent defendants to convict themselves in exchange for a certain,
reduced penalty."30 5
Understandably, a significant percentage of defendants choose to
accept plea bargains because few defendants can afford to go to trial,
many defendants cannot make bail and want to avoid prolonged pretrial
detention, and continued court appearances can be "tedious,
inconvenient, and sometimes humiliating." 0 6  Moreover, "'almost
everyone, including defendants, believe[s] that [the trial penalty
exists]."' 3 07 The trial penalty is the penalty judges impose at sentencing
"on those defendants with the temerity to go to trial."3 0 s
There is ample support for the existence of such a penalty as "several
studies that attempt like-to-like comparisons do find quite substantial
differences in the sentences imposed after jury trials relative to those
imposed after guilty pleas." 3 09 For example,
in one study of sentences imposed for different offense types in five
states, researchers found "consistent support" for the hypothesis that
jury trial cases are associated with harsher average sentences than
302. Combs, supra note 292, at 27.
303. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909,
1943 (1992).
304. Id.
305. Combs, supra note 292, at 27 n.100.
306. Michael M. O'Hear, Plea Bargaining and Procedural Justice, 42 GA. L. REv. 407, 418-19
(2008).
307. Id. at 419 n.33 (quoting CANDACE MCCOY, POLITICS AND PLEA BARGAINING: VICTIMS'
RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA 164 (1993)).
308. Id. at 419.
309. Id at4l9n.33.
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guilty plea cases, including a finding of a 350% plea-trial differential
in sentence length in heroin distribution cases in one state.310
And in another study, "researchers found that sentences following
jury trials were 44.5 months longer than those following guilty pleas,
after controlling for offense type, criminal justice status at time of arrest,
prior record, attorney type, geographic location, pretrial status, age, race,
and gender."" Other studies, however, do not reveal a trial penalty.3 12
But the key point is not whether there is in fact a trial penalty; the key
point is that the majority of defendants believe there is a trial penalty,
which "drives the perceived need to plead guilty."313
Thus, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire's assertion that
defendants offered favorable plea bargains are especially likely to risk
trial appears ill-founded. Instead, a prosecutor's offer of a favorable plea
bargain is probative of the weakness of the prosecution's case, which, in
turn, is probative of the defendant's innocent state of mind and his actual
innocence. A significant percentage of innocent defendants still decide
to accept such plea bargains for some of the reasons listed above, and
those reasons explain why rejection of a favorable plea bargain is
probative of a defendant's innocent state of mind. Of course, a
prosecutor could have a weak case against a guilty defendant and offer a
favorable plea bargain for this or other reasons to the guilty defendant,
who might reject it based upon his relative lack of risk aversion.
Nonetheless, the empirical evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom
seem to suggest that the former scenario is much likelier than the latter,
meaning that a favorable plea offer and a defendant's rejection of it has
strong probative value on two fronts. And as the Second Circuit found in
Biaggi, the fact "[t]hat the jury might not draw the inference urged by the
defendant does not strip the evidence of probative force."3 14
As the Second Circuit also found in Biaggi, evidence that a
defendant rejected an offer of immunity is strongly probative of the
defendant's innocent state of mind. 1  And according to the court,
"[r]ejection of an offer to plead guilty to reduced charges could also
310. Id. (citing Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences
After Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 959,
973, 975 (2005)).
311. Id. (citing Candace McCoy, Plea Bargaining as Coercion: The Trial Penalty and Plea
Bargaining Reform, 50 CRIM. L.Q. 67, 88-90 (2005)).
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 690-91 (2d Cir. 1990).
315. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
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evidence an innocent state of mind, but the inference is not nearly so
strong as rejection of an opportunity to preclude all exposure to a
conviction and its consequences."3 16 In reality, however, immunity is
rarely the "Get Out of Jail Free" card that the Second Circuit made it out
to be.
Before 1970, "Congress authorized only one form of immunity
called 'transactional' immunity." 317  After being given transactional
immunity, the witness could not "be prosecuted for any crimes relating to
the compelled testimony."3 18 In 1970, however, "Congress replaced the
transactional immunity statute with one authorizing 'use' or 'derivative
use' immunity, a narrower form of immunity that protects witnesses
from any prosecution that relies on the use of the compelled testimony or
evidence derived from the testimony." 319 Under use or derivative use
immunity, the government can prosecute the immunity grantee for any
crimes relating to his compelled testimony, but "it has the burden to
show by a preponderance of the evidence that it obtained the evidence
used to file charges against the immunized party from sources wholly
independent of the immunized testimony."320
Prosecutors can, of course, still offer transactional immunity, but,
understandably, "prosecutors are more predisposed to offer use
immunity."321 Indeed, while the Second Circuit's opinion in Biaggi does
not reveal what type of immunity Wedtech Chief Executive Officer
Mariotta rejected, the court does indicate that four other Wedtech
officials testified under grants of use immunity, 32 2 so this was
presumably what Mariotta was offered as well. What this means is not
that these officials were given the opportunity to preclude all exposure to
a conviction and its consequences. It merely means that any testimony
they gave, and any evidence derived from that testimony, could not later
be used to prosecute them. Therefore, rejection of an offer of immunity
is a lot less probative of a defendant's innocent state of mind than the
Second Circuit made it out to be.
316. Biaggi, 909 F.2d at 691.
317. John F. Decker, Legislating New Federalism: The Call for Grand Jury Reform in the
States, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 341, 362 (2005).
318. Id.
319. Id
320. Id. at 362-63.
321. Christine J. Saverda, Note, Accomplices in Federal Court: A Case for Increased
Evidentiary Standards, 100 YALE L.J. 785, 789 n.27 (1990).
322. United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 670 (2d Cir. 1990).
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Of course, at the time that a prosecutor offers and the prospective
witness rejects immunity, the prospective witness might not even be
suspected of any criminal wrongdoing. As noted above, prosecutors
offer immunity to those who they think can incriminate important
criminals but who might refuse to do so unless offered immunity. 3 23
Such an offeree might reject an offer of use immunity based upon the
belief that he has less chance of being prosecuted by declining the offer
than by accepting the offer and testifying. Recognizing this concern,
some state courts have rejected use immunity and required transactional
immunity because of the insufficient assurance that a prosecution
permitted by use immunity "'will in fact be based upon actually
independent evidence."'
324
Conversely, the Second Circuit seemingly overstated its case when it
concluded that "[a] plea rejection might simply mean that the defendant
prefers to take his chances on an acquittal by the jury, rather than accept
the certainty of punishment after a guilty plea."3 2 5 The conviction from a
defendant's guilty plea is punishment, but in many cases, that is the only
punishment received by the defendant. In Woodsum, discussed in the
Introduction to this Article, the defendant declined a plea bargain under
which his jail time would have been deferred.326 In other cases,
prosecutors offer defendants plea bargains under which they would
receive no jail time at all.327 Moreover, prosecutors often offer plea
bargains under which defendants can plead guilty in exchange for a
sentence of time served.328 If such defendants, like many defendants,
cannot afford bail, they trade the certainty of release for continued
pretrial detention and the uncertainty of trial if they reject a plea bargain.
In finding that a defendant's rejection of an offer of immunity is
probative of his innocent state of mind, the Second Circuit in Biaggi also
acknowledged that "there may be reasons for rejecting the offer that are
consistent with guilty knowledge, such as fear of reprisal from those who
323. See supra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
324. Roderick R. Ingram, Note, A Clash of Fundamental Rights: Conflicts Between the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments in Criminal Trials, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 299, 305-06 (1996) (quoting
I CHARLES T. MCCORMICK ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 143 (John William Strong ed., 4th
ed. 1992)).
325. Biaggi, 909 F.2d at 691.
326. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
327. See Montr6 D. Carodine, Keeping It Real: Reforming the "Untried Conviction"
Impeachment Rule, 69 MD. L. REV. 501, 538 (2010).
328. See Lawrence C. Marshall, Litigating in the Shadow ofInnocence, 68 U. PITr. L. REV. 191,
197 n.25 (2006) (book review).
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would be inculpated." 3 29 In some cases in which a defendant rejects a
plea bargain, this same concern applies. Prosecutors often offer
defendants favorable plea bargains in exchange for information,
testimony against other defendants, or both, and a defendant who rejects
such a plea bargain could do so based upon the fear of reprisal. 3 30 But in
plenty of cases, prosecutors offer defendants favorable plea bargains
solely in exchange for defendants' guilty pleas to lesser charges. 3 In
such a case, there is no reason to believe that fear of reprisal rather than
an innocent state of mind is the reason for the defendant's rejection of a
favorable plea bargain.
Of course, another string that a prosecutor can attach to an offer of
immunity is that the offeree must engage in investigative assistance. For
instance, in the previously mentioned Fifth Circuit opinion in Maloof, the
defendant rejected an offer of immunity that would have required him to
surreptitiously record conversations by other suspects.3 32 It is easy to see
why the defendant would have rejected that offer independent of an
alleged innocent state of mind, and yet the Fifth Circuit found that his
rejection passed the Rule 403 balancing test.3 33 Again, prosecutors can
offer plea bargains in exchange for such substantial assistance as well,
but in many other cases, no such string is attached, making a defendant's
rejection of such an offer relatively more probative.
Overall, then, it does not appear that evidence that a defendant
rejected an immunity offer has significantly more probative value than
evidence that a defendant rejected a favorable plea offer. Therefore,
given the fact that evidence of a favorable plea offer has significantly
more probative value for establishing the weakness of the prosecution's
case than evidence of an offer of immunity, the overall probative value
of these two types of evidence is at worst commensurate. Of course, a
lot depends on the details of a given offer. If a defendant is charged with
murder in the first degree and rejects an offer to plead guilty to murder in
the second degree, the offer and rejection likely have little probative
329. Biaggi, 909 F.2d at 690.
330. See, e.g., Nicole L. Phillips & Stephen Smith, Reinterpreting the Ethical Duties of a
Prosecutor: Y-STR as a Model Investigatory Tool, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHiCS 1073, 1084 (2009)
(noting that making plea bargains in exchange for investigative assistance or testimony is part of the
prosecutor's investigatory role).
331. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion,
67 FORDHAM L. REv. 13, 24 (1998) ("The typical plea bargain arrangement involves an agreement
by the prosecutor to dismiss the most serious charge or charges in exchange for the defendant's
guilty plea to a less serious offense.").
332. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
333. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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value. But if that same defendant rejects an offer to plead guilty to
voluntary manslaughter, the probative value of the offer and rejection
increase substantially.
Assuming that the rejected plea bargain is sufficiently favorable to
have at least moderate probative value, courts should only exclude such
evidence under Rule 403 if that probative value is substantially
outweighed by the dangers identified in the rule. As noted, courts have
found that the dangers of admitting evidence that defendants rejected
favorable plea bargains are the dangers of confusing and misleading the
jury.334 As the Supreme Court of New Hampshire found in Woodsum,
the admission of such evidence creates "the great likelihood that its
admission will draw extraneous, misleading information into a criminal
trial .... [And this] inevitably invites an exploration of such collateral
matters as the prosecutor's reasons for making the offer .. . or the
defendant's motives for rejecting it.",3 35
It is difficult to say what other collateral matters besides these two
would need to be explored if courts allowed defendants to present
evidence that they rejected favorable plea bargains. If such evidence
were allowed, the defendant would testify that he rejected a favorable
plea offer because he knew that he did not commit the crimes charged
and wanted to prove his innocence at trial. The prosecution would then
cross-examine the defendant and seek to prove that he had other reasons
for rejecting the offer. For instance, if the offer was contingent on the
defendant testifying against his alleged co-conspirators, the prosecutor
could question the defendant about whether he rejected the offer because
of fear of reprisal.
The prosecution would then presumably call someone for the
government to explain why the favorable plea bargain was offered. In
the above example, the government representative would explain that the
deal was offered because they wanted the defendant to testify against
those higher up in the criminal conspiracy. Defense counsel would then
cross-examine the representative and seek to prove that the prosecutor
had other reasons for making the offer. Defense counsel could, for
example, question the representative about whether the favorable deal
was offered based upon the weakness of the prosecution's case against
the defendant.
Such evidence could be confusing and misleading to jurors because
it could invite consideration of other cases and the mechanics of plea
334. See State v. Woodsum, 624 A.2d 1342, 1344 (N.H. 1993).
335. Id.
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bargaining rather than the actual evidence of the defendant's innocence
or guilt. That said, courts consistently allow defendants to present other
evidence regarding plea offers that invite jurors to consider such
collateral matters. For instance, it is well established that defendants can
impeach witnesses for the prosecution through evidence that those
witnesses were offered plea bargains in exchange for their testimony.33 6
And prosecutors often respond to such impeachment by presenting
evidence about the complete plea bargain, including "the application of
the plea bargain to 'any case that [the witness] might be involved in."'
33 7
Sometimes, the impeachment of prosecution witnesses regarding plea
bargains can be quite extensive, with such impeachment spanning "forty-
two pages of the record" in the Eighth Circuit case, Willis v. United
States.338 If such interrogations are not too confusing or misleading to
pass the Rule 403 balancing test, then surely evidence that the actual
defendant in a case rejected a plea bargain can pass the test as well.
Moreover, evidence that a defendant rejected a plea offer is no more
confusing or misleading than evidence that a defendant rejected an
immunity offer, and courts have consistently found that evidence of such
a latter rejection passes the Rule 403 balancing test.3 3 9 Furthermore, as
noted, prosecutors often offer plea bargains to defendants solely in
exchange for their guilty pleas to lesser charges while prosecutors always
offer immunity to procure the offeree's testimony against some other
defendant.340 In cases in which a defendant rejects a plea bargain offered
solely in exchange for his guilty plea, evidence of his rejection is
substantially less confusing and misleading than evidence that a
defendant rejected an offer of immunity because the evidence would
solely relate to the defendant's case. In sum, evidence that a defendant
rejected a favorable plea bargain is no more, and possibly less, confusing
and misleading than evidence that a defendant rejected an offer of
immunity, meaning that the former type of evidence should also pass the
Rule 403 balancing test.
336. See, e.g., Briley v. Bass, 742 F.2d 155, 160 (4th Cir. 1984).
337. Id. at 158 (alteration in original).
338. 87 F.3d 1004, 1006 (8th Cir. 1996).
339. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
340. See supra note 331 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Federal Rule of Evidence 410 deems inadmissible statements made
during plea discussions when offered "against the defendant who made
the plea or was a participant in plea discussions."34 1 In amending this
Rule in 1979, Congress made clear the purpose of the rule: to protect
criminal defendants in the plea bargaining process.342 According to
Congress, under the Rule, a defendant can present exculpatory
statements made during plea discussions, and only after he has done so
can the opposing party present incriminatory statements made by the
defendant during such discussions.3 43
This Article makes clear that courts have not honored either aspect of
this congressional intent. On the one hand, courts categorically have
prevented defendants from presenting evidence that they rejected
favorable plea bargains.34 On the other, courts consistently have thrown
Mezzanatto's caution to the wind and allowed prosecutors to force
defendants to waive the protections of the plea-related Rules to get to the
plea bargaining table and allowed them to use defendants' incriminatory
statements during plea discussions as substantive evidence of their
guilt.345 These courts may be right that nothing in the plain language of
Rule 410 prevents defendants from waiving its protections, but it is
equally clear that nothing in the Rule's text precludes defendants from
presenting evidence that they rejected favorable plea bargains. And
because no other rule of evidence prohibits the admission of evidence
that a defendant rejected a favorable plea bargain, courts cannot continue
to deem evidence of rejected plea bargains inadmissible.
341. FED. R. EVID. 410.
342. See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 42-51 and accompanying text.
344. See supra Part III.
345. See supra Part IV.B.
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